Having a Muslim nation as an ally in the “war on terror” is rare. For a Muslim leader, being friends with George W. Bush can be tricky. It doesn’t tend to boost his approval ratings at home.

Nevertheless, since 9/11, Pakistan has been that rare ally. At least, Pervez Musharraf has.

Granted—as far as allies go, he hasn’t exactly been America’s most dependable. Nevermind his undemocratic origins: The Pakistani president’s efforts to confront extremists have been half-hearted; the military over which he long ruled harbors Islamist elements; he pardoned Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan for selling sensitive nuclear secrets to nations such as Iran.

Still, in a region seething with anti-Americanism and hostility against the “war on terror,” Musharraf’s open support for Washington has been pretty remarkable. Facing intense public disapproval in the world’s second-most-populous Muslim country, he allowed the U.S. to conduct military operations and air strikes against terrorist targets in Pakistan and provided intelligence and operational assistance. For his efforts, the U.S. looked past his warts—and awarded his country with billions of dollars. After all, it views Pakistan as a lynchpin in its counterterrorism efforts.

But as of right about now, this alliance is effectively over.

Bad, bad news for the U.S.—and any other nation not interested in the Taliban taking back control of Afghanistan. Warning alarm for anyone not excited to see nuclear weapons in the hands of Muslim extremists.

Pakistanis, on the other hand, are ecstatic. In elections on February 18, they dealt a deadly blow to Musharraf with his billions in American money, empowering a collection of opposition parties—parties that have since formed a coalition government which promises to restore Pakistan to being a parliamentary democracy. It looks like the presidency will shrink to being little more than a ceremonial role.

Musharraf’s political opponents are in charge now. Musharraf himself is calling this the start of a “real democratic era” in his country.

Being as how the alliance with Washington only existed because of an autocratic military leader’s willingness to defy the public, a “real democratic era” in Pakistan means one thing: America’s need for an ally in Pakistan has smacked headlong into a brick wall of hostile Pakistanis.

That opinion was aptly summed up in a headline last week in the News, a Pakistani paper: “Hands Off Please, Uncle Sam.”

What inspired that headline was a visit to Pakistan by two U.S. State Department officials. It so happened that the visit occurred the very day Musharraf swore in the government’s new cabinet. It was a telling coincidence. One, because it signaled Washington’s level of determination—perhaps seasoned with a dash of desperation—to try to secure cooperation in its counter-terrorist measures from the post-Musharraf-era government. Two, because that is exactly what it looked like to Pakistanis, and they were incensed about it. “Here are the Americans, right here in Islamabad, meeting with senior politicians in the new government, trying to dictate terms,”said Zaffar Abbas, editor of Dawn newspaper (emphasis mine). “[C]ertainly no one welcomed their visit here,” said political commentator Pervez Hoodbhoy. “It’s a sign of panic, anxiety, of things slipping through their hand.” Condoleezza Rice said she hoped Pakistanis would interpret the visit “as a sign of respect” for the new government. No such luck. They pretty much interpreted it as the opposite of that.

Signs of the new government’s strong desire to make a clean break from the Musharraf era abound. Officials are vocally expressing their right to make judgments independent of Washington. “If America wants to see itself clean of terrorism,” said Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister and new cabinet member, at a news conference, “we also want that our villages and towns should not be bombed”—apparently referring to U.S. airstrikes in northwest Pakistan. Yesterday, Pakistan’s foreign minister made clear that no foreign forces will be permitted to operate on Pakistani soil.

U.S. officials, fully aware of the dangers fomenting within Pakistan’s borders, are on the knife’s edge watching for how Islamabad will confront these dangers. They have good cause to be nervous.

Many observers are noting the far greater complexity—and potential for gridlock—that will accompany this “real democratic era.” As Sharif told the State Department officials on their visit, Pakistan is “no longer a one-man show.” Through the present and sudden democratization process, a variety of entities have grown in power, especially the parliament and the independent judiciary. Musharraf alone ruled everything. By contrast, the new prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, will have to balance competing elements within his coalition (including Sharif and—pulling him in quite a different direction—Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of the assassinated Benazir Bhutto and still leader of Gilani’s party) against Musharraf (who will remain president) and the Pakistani Army—all while paying heed, far more than Musharraf ever did, to the wishes of his people, and, to whatever degree he so chooses, to those of the United States. That is quite the tangled political snarl.

The White House used to be able to make its requests known with a single phone call to a sympathetic and powerful ear. No longer.

So the situation in Pakistan—volatile as it is—lies further outside of America’s ability to influence it than ever. That makes the new prime minister’s strategies for keeping a lid on the destructive elements harbored within his nation’s borders incredibly important. Early indications are, those strategies give further causes for concern.

Gilani, while acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of extremism in his country, advocates addressing it through non-violent means. He proposes to combat radicals primarily through political and economic changes in tribal areas, including better education and more financial aid. This past Saturday, he announced that his government would seek peace with the Taliban. “We are ready to talk to all those people who give up arms and are ready to embrace peace,” he said.

Gilani shouldn’t hold his breath. Instead, he should study history for examples of when any such public statements achieved any success in disarming anyone.

The Pakistani Taliban praised Gilani’s gesture, but then laid out its own condition for a dialogue: that the prime minister sever ties with Washington. Our jihad is with America, the Taliban commander, Maulvi Faqir, said, but we’ll fight this government too as long as it remains an ally of the U.S. I suspect that this naked ultimatum won’t dissuade Gilani from continuing to try to sweet-talk the Taliban into giving up its weapons.

Asfandyar Wali, president of the Awami National Party, which is part of the new coalition, announced last week that the government would pull out of one district in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province where the military has been battling Islamic warriors since November. “I hate [the phrase] ‘war against terrorism,’” he said. The New York Timesreported that the anp “proposes development in the tribal areas and a sustained dialogue that, it hopes, will answer many grievances with the government that have pushed ethnic groups toward the militants.” What pushes people toward the militants? Grievances with the government? Political and economic issues? Where is the evidence of that?

In truth, what pushes people toward the militants is the militants—who aggressively promote their violent anti-Western ideals through every possible means.

Pakistan is a world-renowned incubator of Islamism. Huge swaths of the country are ruled, independently, by Islamists. The more fragmented, disunited and gridlocked the government becomes, the greater is the extremists’ opportunity to wax strong. In theater after theater, individuals and organizations of their ilk are proving themselves impervious to exactly the sort of strategies this new government proposes to embrace.

This change in government, and the loss of this American ally, promises to seriously cripple efforts in the “war on terror.” Success in allied efforts in Afghanistan depend in large measure on their ability to seal that nation’s border with Pakistan. As Stratfor wrote January 2, “So long as the Taliban have sanctuary and logistical support from Pakistan, transferring all coalition troops in Iraq to Afghanistan would have no effect. And withdrawing from Afghanistan would return the situation to the status quo before Sept. 11. If dealing with the Taliban and destroying al Qaeda are part of any endgame, the key lies in Pakistan. … From the U.S. point of view, Musharraf and the Pakistani army might have been unreliable, but any alternative imaginable would be even worse. Even if their actions were ineffective, some actions were taken. At the very least, they were not acting openly and consistently against the United States.” By all indications, the same will not be true of Islamabad’s new occupants.

But beyond the implications in Afghanistan is the most dangerous trump card of all. As the Philadelphia Trumpet’s editor in chief, Gerald Flurry, wrote in our January issue, “Pakistan also has the nuclear bomb and could be taken over by radical Islam, with plenty of help from Iran. That means it could become a proxy of the Iranian mullahs. This would be the worst possible disaster!”