America’s Future Foreign Policy Is Already Here

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America’s Future Foreign Policy Is Already Here

What not to expect with the change in the United States’ presidential administration

Barack Obama said on the campaign trail that he wasn’t afraid to talk with America’s enemies. Now those enemies want to hold him to his word.

Shortly after Mr. Obama was elected, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered congratulations. The Iranian president said he hoped for the beginning of a new, more open relationship between the two countries—one predicated, of course, on the acknowledgment and acceptance of Iranian power.

Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal soon followed suit, saying he was “ready for dialogue”—that is, “on the basis that the American administration respects our rights and our options.”

Of course, nothing would come from such dialogue, should the president-elect decide to make good on his promises. Not only does history prove it, the current administration does as well.

The fact is, though the current president did resort to military solutions early on, he has converted. Cowboyish reputation notwithstanding, his actions are those of a true believer in just the sort of negotiation and multilateralism espoused by the president-elect. His administration, in everything from its policies on Iran and North Korea to its recent acquiescence to the demands of the G-20 (see the second item in this past Sunday’s “Weekend Web”) and its opening the door to sharia law being imposed on American banks, has become a model of trying to solve international problems via anything other than the use of force.

Let’s look at a few recent upshots of this foreign policy. The latest: Iraq is now dictating terms to America, and the White House calls it a “positive step.”

Ever since Iraq held constitutional elections, the United States has maintained its presence in the country only by Iraqi approval. The Iraqi government gave that approval through a United Nations mandate, a mandate that expires January 1. What will likely now permit U.S. forces to remain beyond that date is the agreement made this week by the Iraqi Cabinet—still subject to ratification by the Iraqi parliament—which cuts out the middleman and puts U.S. troops under the authority of the Iraqi government. This Status of Forces Agreement (sofa) says that U.S. forces must stop patrolling Iraqi towns by next summer, orders the U.S. to turn over all its bases to Iraqi control by the end of next year, and unconditionally demands that the U.S. vacate the country by Dec. 31, 2011.

It also puts American soldiers—there on the business of the U.S. government—at the mercy of the Iraqi justice system. It requires that U.S. forces obtain a court order before they raid houses. It enables American soldiers to be tried in Iraqi courts. It subjects U.S. military vehicles to Iraqi inspection. It prohibits America from using Iraq to attack neighboring countries, like Iran.

Why would America subject itself to such terms? Of course it wants to prove that its number-one aim in deposing Saddam Hussein was not to protect America—since that would be a selfish and hence reprehensible motive—but to serve the Iraqi people, an entirely altruistic goal.

But beyond that, Iran’s fingerprints are all over this deal. Some commentators see it as strong evidence of the Iraqi government’s independence from Tehran, since the Iranian leaders had been trying to undermine the pact. But why, then, did the head of the Iranian judiciary praise the agreement immediately after it was approved? “The change in tone,” wrote Stratfor, “suggests that the agreement has been tweaked to allay Iranian concerns, and it indicates a desire in Tehran to engage in fruitful negotiations with Washington. … To have Iran to give a nod to the sofa at this stage in the game, the United States surely must have offered Tehran something in return” (November 17).

Something in return? Aren’t the Iran-friendly terms of the sofa generous enough? Not only did the U.S. give in on Iran’s key demand—that the U.S. not be allowed to attack other countries from Iraqi soil—it has agreed to an unconditional timetable for a pullout that will surely open the door for Iran to increase its influence in Iraq even more.

Can the next president help Iran out more than the current one already has?

Another example. Afghan President Hamid Karzai said on Sunday that he wants to negotiate directly with the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar. Despite the fact that the U.S. has a $10 million bounty on his head, Karzai said that if Omar agreed to negotiate, he would guarantee his security. Karzai threw out this challenge: “If I say I want protection for Mullah Omar, the international community has two choices: Remove me or leave.”

Don’t expect the U.S. to confront the Afghan leader, though. A month ago, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates himself said the U.S. would be open to negotiating with the Taliban if it meant an end to the war. “At the end of the day,” Gates has said, “that’s how most wars end. … That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.” Even the commander of nato and U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Gen. David D. McKiernan, on a recent trip to Washington, said the notion of “reconciliation, I think, is appropriate.”

Realize, this is essentially what the Taliban has been fighting for the past seven years: to bring the West to the point of capitulation.

President-elect Obama speaks about the Afghanistan situation as if he can decisively solve the problem. He sternly promises to “kill or capture Osama bin Laden” and to “stamp out al Qaeda once and for all.” But in a Washington Post article last week, “Obama to Explore New Approach in Afghanistan War,” some details of the Obama camp’s possible plans emerged. “The incoming Obama administration plans to explore a more regional strategy to the war in Afghanistan—including possible talks with Iran—and looks favorably on the nascent dialogue between the Afghan government and ‘reconcilable’ elements of the Taliban, according to Obama national security advisers,” it said.

Little did the president-elect know that Hamid Karzai considers even Mullah Omar one of those “reconcilable” Talibani.

Then again, maybe he did. After all, he’s considering solving the Afghan riddle by bringing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into the discussion.

How would talking with Iran help in containing the Taliban? What would be the substance of these “possible talks”? Undoubtedly the U.S. would offer more concessions to Iran to convince it to withdraw its support for the Taliban insurgency. It’s main bargaining chip is Iraq.

Might we see the U.S., in order to gain breathing room in Afghanistan, feed Iraq to Iran? We at the Trumpet have been watching for some such eventuality for years.

Ironically, the U.S. could turn around and use that breathing room only to seek a “reconciliation” with the Taliban that will leave the country in much the same state it was before American forces went in there.

These are the blind alleys into which such unrealistic foreign policy can lead a nation. As Walid Phares correctly notes, “The problem is not the idea of ‘talking’ to any of the players, including the current foes; engaging in contacts is always an option and has always been practiced. The problem is the perception by the new U.S. officials (and even current ones) that we can simply and naively ‘create’ the conditions that we wish, regardless of the intentions of the other side. When reading these suggestions, one concludes that they were conceived on paper as unilateral designs lacking any strategic understanding of the enemy.”

Yes, even the current officials are engaged in these fatuous talks. As the Post article notes, “Senior officers [in the Bush administration] describe a substantial portion of Taliban foot soldiers as more opportunistic than ideologically committed”—meaning, perhaps they can be coerced away from their cause.

The U.S. really shouldn’t get its hopes up with the change in administration. America’s future foreign policy is already here.

The Bible prophesies of a spectacular clash between an end-time “king of the north” and “king of the south.” The king of the south in this prophecy is here—in fact, this power is the number-one instigator behind the terrorism America is working to stamp out.

The truth is that it has been America’s war in Iraq, coupled with soft policies such as those America is demonstrating toward the Iranian regime, that is directly enabling the rise of this power! You can read more about that in our booklet The King of the South. Expect America’s next president, with his promises of meetings without preconditions, to aggravate the trend.

For a look at a foreign policy that will work in handling the problems of terrorism and Iran, read “The Ostrich, the Warrior and the Whirlwind.”