Winning without war: Chinese supremacy in global supply chains

Since the end of World War II, technological superiority has been the cornerstone of American military strategy. Over the past 80 years, the U.S. restrained the all-out world war conflict of the twentieth century with sufficient numbers, highly capable weaponry, and logistical agility to timely deliver force en masse. The success of this strategy has also shaped how China is challenging the existing U.S.-led world order. Violent confrontation while the U.S. maintains this technological advantage with a network of alliances would mean ruin. Instead, China seeks to win on a battlefield more discrete but as consequential to American interests: supply chains.

Framing this global supply chain competition in militaristic terms is important, given the potential impact to U.S. military readiness and power projection capabilities globally. While generations of U.S. scholars and government officials previously held up China as a model for countries seeking to integrate with the global economy through cooperation and peace, it is becoming increasingly clear that leaders in the Chinese Communist Party seek outcomes that run counter to American interests. The systematic suppression of dissent in Hong Kong, the consistent threats from the People’s Liberation Army to conquer Taiwan, and the persecution of Uighur Muslims are all examples of how China will likely use its influence, particularly as the country expands an already dominant role in global supply chains.

To what extent does China control supply chains and how will this impact the U.S. military? In microchips and semiconductors, which are used in everything from iPhones to the newest F-35 fighter jets, China is on track to achieve its goal to fulfill 70% of domestic production requirements by 2025 and to lead global production by 2030. While the U.S. and its allies account for more than 53 percent of these technological building blocks and China lags at 6 percent, the country has earmarked $118 billion to further develop its domestic industry—a development which the Center for Strategic and International Studies assesses will be used for “intelligence, military, commercial, and political advantage.” The loss in global market share would limit the pool of potential chip vendors that support the production of American military equipment and weapon systems.