In the hours after the Second Lebanon War began in 2006, Ehud Barak reportedly warned Prime Minister Olmert to clearly define how the war would end, “because the more time goes by,” Barak told him, “the greater the potential for complications.” This seemingly sage counsel actually highlights Israel’s greatest weakness when it comes to warfare.

Early on in the conflict with Hezbollah, Ehud Olmert demanded the return of the two kidnapped soldiers and the enforcement of UN Resolution 1559, which called for the disbanding and disarmament of Hezbollah. “We will continue, without hesitating, without capitulating and without fretting,” Olmert confidently asserted before Knesset members, “until our goals are achieved” (emphasis mine throughout).

The problem wasn’t that Israel’s objectives were ambiguous in the lead-up to the war. They were actually quite clear—some would say ambitious.

It’s just that Israel lacked the will to win. What Barak was essentially saying to Olmert at the outset of the war was that unless victory could be obtained quickly and easily, the situation would worsen for Israel.

But wars are rarely quick—and they’re never easy. In the case of Israel’s war against Hezbollah, as time wore on, complications did emerge. They always do in war. But instead of overcoming those obstacles en route to victory, no matter what the cost, Israel’s weak leaders instead chose to revise their objectives on the fly, and after just 34 days, accept defeat in the form of a meaningless United Nations-brokered ceasefire.

Hezbollah continues to reap fruitful dividends from its stunning victory. It is now more powerful than ever—wielding control over Lebanon both militarily and politically.

Israel, on the other hand, is now warring against another Iranian proxy on its southern front.

Based on Israel’s most recent failure in Lebanon, and knowing what God has prophesied about Israel’s weak will and its “deadly wound” (see Leviticus 26:19 and Hosea 5:13), what can we foresee about the latest chapter of the Israeli-Arab conflict?

Preparations for War

The war in Gaza began like the one in Lebanon did 2½ years ago—with terrorists launching a barrage of rockets and mortars on Israeli targets. Hamas used its six-month ceasefire with Israel to thoroughly prepare for war—doubling the size and range of its missile arsenal, organizing a 20,000-man army into eight divisions and constructing a vast network of underground tunnels along Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt. By the time the ceasefire ended on December 19, it was itching for a fight.

For its part, Israel also used the ceasefire to prepare for conflict. For six months Israeli agents gathered actionable intelligence on Hamas’s security infrastructure inside Gaza—locating bases, weapons caches, training camps, safe houses and underground tunnel complexes. Then, even after vowing publicly to retaliate against Hamas’s most recent attack, Israel used a clever disinformation campaign to catch Hamas by surprise last weekend, which resulted in numerous direct hits once the bombing campaign began. Hamas was also surprised by the intensity of the attack, which included 80 fighter-bombers and helicopters destroying more than 100 targets in Gaza and killing at least 200 Hamas fighters. Columnist Ralph Peters summarized the first day of airstrikes like this:

Given the fact that Hamas adheres to the terrorist practice of locating command sites, arsenals and training facilities in heavily populated areas, the results suggest that the idf—supported by first-rate intelligence work—may have executed the most accurate wave of airstrikes in history, with a 15-to-1 terrorist-to-civilian kill ratio.

Yet, despite the success of the opening salvo of airstrikes, as we wrote, “It’s hard to see how Israel’s retaliation against the constant rocket barrage from Gaza will turn out well for the Jewish state—even in the short run.” There are several reasons why we said that—some of them referred to above.

Israel began this campaign with the ambiguous objective of improving the security situation in the south and bolstering Israel’s deterrence against terrorist attacks. One important lesson Israeli leaders have apparently taken from Lebanon is that their objectives this time around should be much less ambitious.

“Hamas is dazed and confused and has no explanation to offer its people,” a senior Israeli Defense Ministry official told Israel Radio the day after the airstrikes began. “But we must refrain from bragging and marking dramatic objectives.”

Israel’s plan, in other words, is only to weaken Hamas. Yet, despite the obvious success of the initial bombing campaign, even weakening Hamas is proving to be more difficult than many imagined. Defense Minister Barak has forewarned Israelis to prepare for a difficult and lengthy struggle—one that might take several weeks or even months.

But what Barak hasn’t stated—at least not publicly—is that because of Israel’s weak will, the more time that goes by, the greater the potential for complications.

Difficulties Emerge

The first complications surfaced on Monday when, after recovering from the initial shock of the aerial bombardment, Hamas operatives reemerged from hiding behind civilians in nurseries, hospitals and schools to launch more than 80 rockets and mortars at Israel—one of them killing a construction worker and wounding 10 others in Ashkelon. Terrorists took advantage of cloudy, drizzly weather, which made it more difficult for Israeli aircraft to identify launching crews. That night, Hamas officials were quoted in the media as saying they were hoping Israel would launch a ground incursion, knowing it would result in a higher rate of casualties for the Israel Defense Forces.

On Tuesday, Hamas launched another 40 rockets into the western Negev, two of them exploding in Beersheva, located about 25 miles from Gaza. It was the longest distance a Palestinian rocket had ever traveled within Israel. As Stratfor noted on Tuesday, these weapons—most likely Grad artillery rockets—measure 10 feet in length, weigh between 100 and 175 pounds and require multiple people for transportation and set-up. “Destroying these rockets,” Stratfor wrote,

should have been one of the first objectives of any Israeli military assault on Gaza. While Israel was never going to destroy every last cache of rockets, especially from the air, it does not bode well for Israel that Hamas is demonstrating a new capability at the end of several days of bombardment by the Israeli Air Force—which is specifically targeting, among other things, that very rocket arsenal.

Thus, within three days of stunning Hamas with a devastating air strike, Israel had already arrived at a most problematic phase in the war. With the surprise strike now over, the iaf’s bank of targets nearly exhausted and Hamas and its arsenal still intact, Israel’s leaders argued over whether to send in ground troops or look for a diplomatic exit.

On Tuesday night, Prime Minister Olmert met with his senior advisers for a tense, four-hour discussion about Israel’s options. According to the Guardian, Defense Minister Barak—who vowed to pay back Hamas “big-time” for its rocket assault and who had spoken enthusiastically about an extended four-week operation just two days earlier—urged the prime minister to accept a 48-hour truce put forward by the French.

The next day, though Olmert rejected the idea of a temporary ceasefire, Israel’s war strategy was showing signs of completely unraveling. The air campaign had failed to deal the decisive blow Israel’s war planners had hoped for. And so Israel is left with the much less desirable option of sending in ground troops—or returning to the status quo of a one-sided ceasefire agreement.

The longer the war continues, the more complicated it becomes, which is why Israel is again looking for a way out. Yesterday, Prime Minister Olmert said, “We have no interest in conducting a protracted campaign.”

By contrast, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh defiantly announced Wednesday night, “With God’s help, victory will be ours, because these people stand firm, the resistance stands firm and because the occupation will fail to achieve anything.”

They’re in it for the long haul. That is why, as Stratfor noted on Wednesday, time favors Hamas.

Who Wins in the End?

Hamas has learned many valuable lessons in warfare by observing Israel’s previous failures. As Bret Stephens wrote for the Wall Street Journal, Hamas is

sustained by the insight that Israel’s considerable military capabilities are unlikely to be matched by political will. It believes that whatever attacks come will be tempered by a host of humanitarian and diplomatic considerations. It believes that Israel wants to avoid a public relations debacle (so Hamas will do everything it can to engineer or fabricate one). It believes that the weight of international sympathy will be on its side. It believes, too, that the last thing Israel wants is to reoccupy Gaza, with all the costs and complications that entails.

For Hamas, the long-term objective has always been to destroy Israel. In the near term, as it was for Hezbollah in 2006, the goal is simply survival.

At the end of this problematic phase for Israel, if Hamas survives, it wins. And if it wins, Iran’s proxy state of Hamastan will remain at the frontline of the Palestinian struggle against Israel, garner more popular support throughout the Arab world, receive international legitimacy and enjoy the rapid advancement of its power and influence, both politically and militarily.

In other words, Israel loses.