Almost six years on from 9/11, al Qaeda has not been defeated in the war on terror, the latest U.S. intelligence outlook confirms. It also substantiates the reality that Iran is the prime state sponsor of terrorists worldwide, including al Qaeda.

The National Intelligence Estimate, released July 17, reveals that one of the two known leadership “councils,” or Shura Majlis, of al Qaeda meets in Iran. Citing a final working draft of the intelligence document, New York Sun columnist Eli Lake reports that the American intelligence community believes that dozens of senior al Qaeda leaders operate from Iran with the aid of Iran’s Quds force, the terrorist unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which reports directly to Iran’s supreme leader. According to three American intelligence sources, says Lake, top al Qaeda figures meet regularly in eastern Iran to make policy and plan attacks.

As Investor’s Business Daily writes, “Iran has, in effect, made it possible for al Qaeda to function even as we hunt down its leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq. It’s aiding and abetting our enemy” (July 17).

“We know that there were two al Qaeda centers of gravity,” Roger Cressey, a former deputy to a counterterrorism tsar, Richard Clarke, said in an interview last week. “After the Taliban fell, one went to Pakistan, the other fled to Iran.”

Three of the most senior al Qaeda leaders who have found refuge in Iran are Saif al-Adel, a military planner trained in the Egyptian special forces who fled to Iran after al Qaeda was driven from Afghanistan in 2001; Suleiman Abu Ghaith, al Qaeda’s propaganda minister; and Saad bin Laden, one of Osama bin Laden’s sons. Senior al Qaeda members reside in a military base near Tehran, a Tehran suburb, a Shiite holy city and a town near the Afghanistan border, according to the intelligence estimate.

Since 2003, the Iranian branch of al Qaeda has been heavily involved in helping to establish the group in Iraq, where it now has a large network in place. “In the past year,” writes Lake, “the multinational Iraq command force has intercepted at least 10 couriers with instructions from the Iran-based Shura Majlis.”

Lake reports that there is little dispute in the intelligence community that al Qaeda’s leadership operates from Iran. There is some contention, however, concerning the degree of official Iranian involvement—whether Tehran is simply tolerating the presence of al Qaeda’s leadership or actively assisting it. The U.S. State Department and the cia like to think that the Quds force is operating as a rogue force in its support of al Qaeda—this conveniently allows the U.S. administration to avoid confronting Iran’s leadership on the issue. Evidence, however, points to Iran’s cooperation with al Qaeda being official policy.

“It is just impossible to believe that what the Quds force does with al Qaeda does not represent a decision of the government,” an intelligence official, who asked not to be identified, said. “It’s a bit like saying the directorate of operations for the cia is not really carrying out U.S. policy.”

As theTrumpet.com has pointed out before, though Iran is at odds ideologically with Sunni terrorists operating in Iraq, including al Qaeda, this has not stopped it supporting these jihadists with arms to further its own ends: namely, to make staying in Iraq more untenable for the U.S. by directly attacking American forces and by fueling the flames of sectarian violence.

As Vali Nasr, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said, “Iran and al Qaeda do not have to like one another. They can hate each other, they can kill each other, their ultimate goals may be against one another, but for the short term Iran can unleash al Qaeda on the United States.”

Thus far, the U.S. has failed to confront Iran on all the proxy wars it is waging in the region. We expect the U.S. to respond no differently to Iran’s support of al Qaeda in Iraq. The U.S. is likely to respond with intensified negotiations rather than confrontation. In fact, just yesterday the United States and Iran launched a second round of direct talks in Baghdad between top-level policymakers of the two nations.

This approach, however, plays directly into Tehran’s hands.

A primary bargaining chip Iran has in its discussions with the U.S. over Iraq is the fact it has the power to curtail the sectarian violence in that country. Certainly it has a great degree of influence over the Shiites in Iraq; the U.S. is trying to cut a deal with Tehran that will cause it to reign in Shiite violence rather than foment it as it has been doing. But, as is becoming increasingly clear, Tehran has influence over more than just the Shiite violence in Iraq. This latest confirmation—that Iran is providing sanctuary for al Qaeda leadership, enabling it to plan and conduct operations in Iraq—shows that Iran has a remarkable degree of influence over the overall situation in that country, specifically the jihadist violence against U.S. forces.

This influence gives it remarkable bargaining power in negotiations with the U.S. For a greater slice of the pie in Iraq—perhaps more political influence, perhaps more military influence—in a deal that enables a U.S. drawdown, Iran can promise to cease supporting these terrorists. (On the other hand, it can also unleash all these violent forces if the U.S. goes against its wishes.)

Hence, by pursuing a policy of negotiation, the U.S. is actually encouraging Iran to support terrorism; these terrorist proxies are Tehran’s bargaining chips.

That is just one illustration of why negotiations, rather than confrontation, with an enemy of this type simply do not work.

Any concessions on the part of Iran—for example, promising to crack down on al Qaeda operatives or leadership—will be a sign of American weakness, not strength. For Iran will only concede if America agrees to Iranian demands in Iraq.

As long as these proxies allow Tehran to gain concessions—and achieve its goals—expect Iranian support of al Qaeda to continue.