Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula?

North Korea’s history of broken promises should temper the optimism.
 

Is it time to break out some bottles of premium soju? Is it time to award United States President Donald Trump the Nobel Peace Prize? To many, recent news out of North Korea makes it seem so.

Late last month, Kim Jong-un crossed the border into the South, marking the first time any North Korean leader has done so for as long as the two have existed as separate nations. Then in an unscripted moment, Kim took South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s hand and the two stepped briefly into North Korea, then back again.

Kim and Moon then planted a tree together and agreed to formally end the Korean War by the end of the year. Kim also committed to “complete denuclearization.” Historically, when North Korean leaders have discussed denuclearizing the peninsula, they have meant that the U.S. must withdraw its nuclear umbrella over South Korea. But this time, Kim specified that the offer comes with no requirements, an end to the U.S.-South Korea alliance, or the withdrawal U.S. troops from the South. Kim even invited experts and journalists from the U.S. and South Korea to watch later this month as the North dismantles the Punggye-ri nuclear testing site, where all six of the country’s nuclear tests have occurred.

“A new history begins now—at the starting point of history and the era of peace,” Kim wrote in the Peace House guest book.

Kim promised to suspend all nuclear and missile tests and said he would now pursue economic growth and peace. Significantly, there have been no such tests for five months.

North and South pledged to increase reunions between families that have been divided since the war, relink a railway between the nations, and establish a liaison office in the North.

The North and South are even syncing their clocks, with North Korea shifting its time zone 30 minutes earlier to align with South Korea “as a first practical step for national reconciliation and unity.”

Kim is scheduled to meet with President Trump in the next few weeks, probably at the Demilitarized Zone (dmz) between the North and South. As a goodwill gesture ahead of the visit, Kim has released three U.S. citizens from one of the regime’s notorious prison camps. As a result of all this, Moon says President Trump deserves the Nobel Peace Prize. Some U.S. lawmakers have officially nominated Trump for the prize.

It looks like peace and love are in the air, which is certainly preferable to nuclear fallout. But a look at the recent history of North Korea shows that celebrations and peace prize discussions may be premature.

A History of Broken Promises

Over the past three decades, North Korean leaders have often expressed willingness to engage in various degrees of denuclearization. And each time, it has broken these promises.

The duplicity began in 1985 when North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt), and then continued to secretly develop its nuclear program.

1992 was another banner year for promises, with the North signing both a joint declaration with the South to denuclearize and a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Association (iaea). The next year, North Korea refused to let the iaea inspect certain areas of its nuclear facilities and threatened to withdraw from the npt.

By May of 1994, North Koreans were unloading fuel rods from a reactor without iaea inspectors present, leading to a major crisis. Understanding that Pyongyang had been deceiving the world in this high-stakes game for almost a decade, the U.S. seriously considered military action. But the North persuaded America to back down by signing the “Agreed Framework,” in which it vowed to suspend and dismantle its nuclear program. Shortly afterward, it secretly resumed developing its uranium enrichment capacity.

In 2000, North and South signed an accord to work together to achieve a peace deal and reunify the peninsula. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his part in the efforts, and the Clinton administration in the U.S. responded by relaxing sanctions on the North. Two years later, the North confirmed U.S. reports that it had been advancing its uranium enrichment capacity, and it told iaea inspectors to leave the country. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test.

Another set of promises came in 2007 when North Korea promised to denuclearize and signed another landmark deal with South Korea for permanent peace. Two years later, the North walked away from all agreements and conducted its second underground nuclear test. It has since conducted four more.

In each instance, the North’s promises were welcomed by the world with hope and optimism. And each time they were broken.

Now North Korea is a nuclear-armed nation.

Maybe this time around is different. Maybe Kim has determined that life would be better for him and his comrades without all the sanctions and embargoes. Maybe after years of obstinacy, he is truly ready to compromise. Maybe President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign worked—perhaps because he was able to bring China onside. Maybe the combination of Trump’s unpredictability and his bellicosity frightened the North into finally yielding.

Many “maybes” are in play. But North Korea’s track record over the last 30 years shows that it is still too early to break out the soju. Celebrating at this point would be premature.

Mission Accomplished for the Nuclear North

Current optimism should also be tempered by the strong probability that Kim’s sudden outreach has come because his nation is now armed with powerful missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

Having a nuclear deterrent in place profoundly strengthens his negotiating position.

“Kim has grasped the hand of Moon principally because he has the nuclear weapons and the delivery system for those weapons and can now turn his attention to the economic future of North Korea,” former State Department official Wendy Sherman told the New Yorker. “No doubt the many years of sanctions, further intensified in the past months, have had an impact on the North, but Kim remains in the driver’s seat on the way ahead.”

Since developing deliverable nuclear warheads has placed Kim in this “driver’s seat,” it is difficult to imagine that he would suddenly surrender them.

Nuclear weapons are vital to the Kim regime’s survival, central to the country’s military strategy, and fundamental to North Korea’s national identity.

Kim also well knows the cautionary tales of Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Both dictators gave up their nuclear weapons programs. And both were later ousted and killed.

Kim would also be well aware of Ukraine’s decision in 1994 to give up its 5,000 nuclear weapons—the world’s third-largest arsenal at the time—in exchange for aid and promises that America would protect Ukraine from any future invasions. Twenty years later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea exposed the hollowness of those U.S. promises.

Dismantling his missiles and warheads would leave North Korea far less able to combat an attack from the U.S. and South Korea. It would dispossess Kim of the very thing that has enabled his impoverished nation to negotiate as an equal with the far richer South, and that has allowed him to intimidate the far wealthier and more powerful U.S.

David French of National Review said that, without nuclear weapons, North Korea is “a ninth-rate nation with a decaying conventional arsenal and zero meaningful leverage over any nation besides South Korea.”

Without its nuclear weapons, the North “is a mere blip on the American radar screen, a minor legacy irritant left over from a long-ended Cold War,” he said.

Denuclearization, French concluded, is “not happening.”

‘A Threat Many Times Greater’

But what very well may happen is that, by bringing Trump to the negotiating table but then failing to deliver on his promises, Kim could convince the South that the U.S. is the party hindering peace. If successful, this strategy could work to weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

If the U.S. military ends up leaving South Korea, which President Trump said on May 3 could soon happen, paths would be cleared for both North and South to be brought into the Russia-China orbit.

This is the end game Russia and China have long hoped for and have been long working toward behind the scenes. If North Korea does disarm or make an appearance of doing so, one or both of these powers will be the true cause for it.

On Sept. 13, 2017, Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry stated that the world should be considerably more concerned about Russia and China than about North Korea because those two nations are the ones that enable the Kim regime’s belligerence. He wrote:

The Bible’s prophecies show that, in a sense, the North Korea crisis is a massive distraction from the real threat posed by China and Russia. These powerful Asian nations are the only reason North Korea is able to operate so freely. And Bible prophecy shows that they pose a threat many times greater than the one from North Korea! Nevertheless, nuclear technology from North Korea could still play a major role in events during the time ahead ….

The prophecies that Mr. Flurry referred to are recorded in Ezekiel 38 and 39, Daniel 11 and in the book of Revelation. These Bible passages show that, in the end time, Russia will lead a staggeringly mighty military confederacy, with China in a secondary leadership role. Less powerful Asian countries, such as North Korea and probably the South as well, will put their power behind this Russian-led bloc.

In his booklet The Prophesied ‘Prince of Russia,’ Mr. Flurry examines these scriptures to explain what this developing scenario means for you, the hope that is tied to it, and what actions you can take as the clouds of the next world war rapidly gather. Please order your free copy of this potentially life-changing booklet today.

https://youtu.be/UBf2TE-NzeI?list=PLrKBlesm40fL_tJlfXnoyX8wbSE-YAxTI