Iraq’s Volatile Parliamentary Reform

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Iraq’s Volatile Parliamentary Reform

Understanding the push for a technocratic Iraqi parliament

Three times now Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has attempted to enact a major cabinet reshuffle. In a parliament plagued by corruption, Abadi wants to replace politicians with technocrats—specialists in individual fields—in the hope that they might govern the nation wisely.

Abadi has called on Iraq’s major factions to submit their candidates to him so that each sect will be well represented. There have been few surprises. Each time Abadi requested candidates for his cabinet, he has received limited cooperation from opposition groups.

Through lack of participation or by design, Abadi has taken it upon himself to choose men for the job. And each failed reshuffle has drawn more condemnation from his opponents. The political infighting has spilled into the streets as protesters voice their frustration and look to break the deadlock through more confrontational means. One leader who is striving hard to break the gridlock is Muqtada al-Sadr.

Power to the Powerful

Sadr and his protesters have been loud advocates of change, particularly in recent weeks. He, like Abadi, has called for a technocratic government and is frustrated by the stagnant parliament. But unlike the prime minister, Sadr wants a complete overhaul: the removal of the old guard.

Since the death of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq has maintained a power-sharing parliament, meaning that each faction and sect has a certain share of parliamentary seats or cabinet positions. The design was intended to loosely bind the various sects and ensure the needs of all the people were addressed.

Sadr condemns this government and its quota-sharing system. He wants technocrats from wherever is necessary. This doesn’t sit well with the elites of the previous era, nor with many of the smaller factions.

Most minorities rely heavily on their quota of parliamentary seats in order to secure funding and patronage. The removal of the quota system would mean the end of guaranteed power for smaller sects. It would also hazard a return to the civil war days, when one-sided policy led to major civil unrest.

Doing away with power sharing means it will be every sect for itself. Sadr just so happens to be Shiite—the most well-represented and most powerful religious sect in the country. If anyone stands to benefit from removing the old guard and instituting a “popularity equals power”-type rule, it is him.

Iran Out?

Such an overhaul could have major ramifications for Iraq’s Shiite neighbor, Iran. When Sadr’s disciples stormed the green zone, they chanted “Iran out.” Sadr has demanded that Iran be extracted from Iraqi politics, potentially reversing decades of Iranian inroads into Baghdad’s political system. But that doesn’t mean Iran’s days of meddling are over. Sadr has a long history with Iran that cannot be so easily brushed under the Persian rug.

In the early days of the 21st century, Sadr was known as a violent extremist. He commanded a private force called the Mahdi Army. This 50,000-strong militia roamed the streets of Baghdad, murdering Sunnis and those who had been a part of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The civil war that raged between the Sunnis and Shiites was largely the result of Sadr’s Mahdi Army running rampant.

Politically, Sadr was active in trying to tear down the fledgling government. He threw his substantial weight and political clout behind Maliki in 2006, before pulling his men out of the cabinet the next year. The move almost brought down the government at the time—providing fertile ground for Iranian expansion. We have seen Iran use political chaos to increase its presence in Egypt, Yemen and Libya in the past. Iraq has been no different.

But that wasn’t the only time Sadr seemed to help Iran.

Sadr’s army also targeted United States forces, claiming to have used at least 6,000 improvised explosive devices during the U.S.-led occupation. The U.S. put out an arrest warrant for Sadr, who, not surprisingly, fled to Iran for sanctuary.

Sadr’s forces clashed with Maliki too but, evidently, not to the detriment of his relationship with Iran. Tehran was eager to give the cleric a home for four years.

With the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011 Sadr returned to Iraq, praying alongside a Sunni leader in Baghdad upon arrival. Suddenly, the bloodthirsty terrorist was talking reconciliation and peace. He was talking like a politician.

Sadr has mastered the art of policy switching. In 2014, he dissolved his political party, renamed his private army, and promised to leave politics.

It didn’t take.

The Political Chameleon

It wasn’t long before Sadr was calling for reform. By dissolving his party, Sadr was able to distance himself from the much-loathed bureaucracy of Baghdad. This allowed him to return as the reinvented grassroots leader of the reformists and not as a part of the systemic government incompetence.

Basically Sadr supported Maliki, then he didn’t. Then he supported Iran, then he couldn’t. He was a radical hard-liner, then he wasn’t. He promised to leave politics, then he wouldn’t. Now he supports Abadi.

Al-Monitor published an article calling Sadr the chameleon of Iraqi politics. It pointed out the Sadrist movement’s hypocrisy. “Ironically, the Sadrist movement was a main participant in corruption and a contributor in the failures that Sadr’s followers were demonstrating against with other protesters—he was part of the government while concurrently opposing said government,” it said.

So when Sadr’s supporters call for Iran to get out, it should be taken with a hefty pinch of salt. Just as when he calls for a technocratic government, or says that he isn’t interested in Abadi’s job, it should be met with a degree of skepticism. The man is pushing his own cabinet of “independents.” But as one aide to the Iraqi leadership told Guardian Unlimited, “We all know that there isn’t anyone who is independent in Iraq.”

There is little wonder why many call Sadr the most dangerous man in Iraq. His political backflips ensure nobody knows which way he will head next. And the Iraq of today allows him to get away with it. Deutsche Welle reported:

Iraq still has no government. At a time when the soul of the citizenry is boiling with anger over rampant corruption, the war on terror is robbing the country of its last resources. Oil prices are in free fall and seem to be dragging the economy into the abyss along with them. The time seems ripe for demagogues.

But if there has been one constant in Sadr’s life—one thing that will keep him close to the Shiite populace and distant from the minorities, the one trait that keeps him inexorably tied to Iran—it is his religious beliefs.

A Shiite at Heart

Regardless of what he says or who he allegedly supports, Sadr’s religious beliefs define him. He may change his political colors every other week, he may change his public image to boost his popularity, but his Shiite upbringing leads to an inevitable conclusion: At the end of the day, Sadr must support Iran.

Iran is Shiite. Shiite policy abroad will always equal positive kickback for Iran. Tehran has time and time again attempted to sway its neighbors—including Iraq—to promote pro-Shiite, pro-Iranian policy. And Iraq has responded! One only needs to look at Baghdad over the past decade to realize just how susceptible the nation has been to Iran’s influence. Even with the “changing of the guard” from Maliki to Abadi, Iran enjoys more influence in the nation than it has had in decades!

Iran wants political control, and the promotion of Shiite interests, both at home and abroad, is a simple way to do it.

Everything to Gain

Iran has nothing to lose by seeing Sadr get his way. Even if he supports a technocratic government, Sadr has shown himself time and again to be pro-Iranian—though he may claim otherwise. If a technocratic government is successfully installed, it will undoubtedly be vetted by Sadr—the real power in the nation. This could finally bring a stable pro-Shiite government to Iraq—something that Iran has striven for throughout the last decade.

If it fails and the nation descends to squabbling again, then Iran loses nothing. The nation’s political system is already in shambles. If anything, a descent into 2006–2007-style chaos may afford Iran more opportunity to increase its influence.

If Sadr decides to take charge—as the recent green zone storming proved he is fully cable of doing—then Iran has a well-trained, well-armed hard-liner ally in charge of the nation and can expect strengthened ties.

Iraq’s Future

Further backing of the inevitable scenario whereby Iraq falls deeper into Iranian hands can be found in the sure word of Bible prophecy.

The Trumpet has repeatedly pointed to prophecies in Daniel that discuss a major Middle Eastern power rising: the king of the south. Combined with another prophecy in Psalm 83, it is evident that Iraq will ally with the Iranian camp in a soon-coming world conflict. For more, read “A Mysterious Prophecy.”

In The King of the South, Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry writes:

The U.S.’s removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 opened the way for Iran to heavily infiltrate Iraq, providing armaments, financing and training to Shiite militias, sending thousands of operatives into the country and establishing economic ties with it. Moreover, the most powerful political party in Iraq is allied with Tehran. This could be a decisive factor causing Iraq to fall under Iran’s control.

What we see today is the product of that meddling. Whether a technocratic government is elected or not, the Iraqi chameleon and his Iranian allies will continue to work toward a strong Shiite-dominated Iraq and the rise of the new Middle East power, the king of the south.