Putin’s Billion-Dollar Bargain in Syria

Considering what he won, Putin may even be surprised by how well his Syrian adventure worked out.

By Brent Nagtegaal • March 21, 2016

Burdened by economic sanctions after his takeover of Crimea and bruised by historic lows in the price of oil, Russian President Vladimir Putin stunned the world last September when he announced a new military mission into the Middle East. At the time, Washington warned that Putin’s venture into Syria would inevitably get Russia stuck in a “quagmire,” while others busily crunched the numbers and wondered how he could afford such a mission.

Yet six months later, when Putin confidently announced the withdrawal of his forces from Syria earlier this week, he was able to declare “mission accomplished.”

In most instances, Putin speaking in such positive terms of his own achievements can be chalked up to mere braggadocio. Yet in this case, he’s telling the truth.

What Syria Cost Putin

According to some estimates, Russia’s total bill for its near-six-month melee into the Middle East cost about $1 billion. According to Moscow, Russia’s total defense budget for 2015 was $50 billion, meaning Syria took up about 2 percent of the allocated yearly funds.

For this amount, Putin was able to put into action about 70 aircraft of varying types and mobilize 4,000 supporting personnel to fly, protect and maintain the fleet. According to Russian commander of the Southern Military District, Alexander Galkin, this billion dollars made possible 1,600 sorties by the premier Sukhoi-25 fighter-bombers over the Syrian skies, with the jets spending a total of more than 1,000 hours in rarified air and dropping 6,000 bombs on the “terrorists.” Naturally, the “terrorist” term applies to anyone Moscow determines is a terrorist, not just the Islamic State. In fact, only about 10-20 percent of those 6,000 bombs hit Islamic State targets. The rest hit United States-backed rebel fighters and other Sunni groups attempting to overthrow Bashar Assad’s dictatorial rule.

As far as human causalities, Russia has been tight-lipped on the exact count, but it appears to be less than a dozen. Materiel losses included one Su-24 fighter shot down over Turkey and one Mi-8 transport helicopter.

What Putin Gained From Syria

Far from being stuck in a quagmire, Putin extracted so many benefits from his escapade in Syria that we need to give them bullet points. Here they are briefly:

Ensured the Syrian regime’s survival: As we reported earlier, Putin decided to enter into the fray only after the request came from Assad and his backer Iran. Syria has long been a critical part of Russia’s ability to project power into the Mediterranean. With Turkey holding the keys to the Mediterranean Sea for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, it was critical that Russia maintain its hold on its military base in Tartus, long assured by Assad.

The commercial benefits: As Michael Weiss wrote, “The Syrian war was as much a mediated weapons and hardware expo as it was a client rescue.” By firing cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea as well as demonstrating the superior power of the Su-34 in the air and the T-90 battle tank on the ground, Russia was able to showcase its modern weaponry. The display reportedly got a host of nations including Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia expressing interest in new weapons contracts. Those contracts alone will likely cover the billion-dollar advertising campaign

Exposed the U.S. as a weakening power in the Middle East: As George Friedman wrote in Geopolitical Futures, “Syria was not about Syria …. Reshaping perceptions of Russian power and demonstrating that it was prepared to deploy, solve a problem, and leave was. In contrast to the Americans who deploy, stay and sink in the mud, the Russians did what they came to do and are now leaving.” To be fair, Russia’s rules of engagement are a little looser than the U.S. in the battle in Syria. Reports indicate that Russians killed about 2,000 civilians in the near-six-month campaign. Such collateral would not be accepted by world opinion if it occurred at the hands of the United States.

Announced itself as a resurgent power in the Middle East: As the U.S. retreats from its historical role as Middle East mediator, Russia has shown its ability to handle itself well in a foreign theater. It has also shown its allies that it will come to their aid. And it has shown its enemies Russia’s willingness to put skin in the game in foreign lands if need be.

Reshaped its image after Ukraine: Ever since Russia invaded Crimea and instructed its little green men to destabilize Ukraine, Putin was largely an anathema to European powers and the U.S. Yet now, Putin has reshaped his image as a stabilizer in the most volatile of regions. Furthermore, the fact that Putin is pulling out of Syria immediately before peace negotiations begin indicates his willingness to pressure Assad to make some concessions moving forward. In all this, Putin has shown himself as a man who can be worked with, not one who can be worked around.

Looking at the above successes, it’s likely even Putin is surprised by how well his Syrian adventure worked out—especially after putting up a measly billion dollars. He has emerged from the potential Syrian quagmire unscathed, emboldened and empowered.

Looking forward to the negotiations, watch for Putin to continue to play the reasonable mediator between the Europeans, Saudis, Turks and Syrians. Also, don’t be surprised if he pushes Assad into providing more concessions than the Iranians want him to give.

Editor in chief Gerald Flurry made a startling forecast at the beginning of the Syrian civil war that, by the end, some seismic shifts in Middle East alliances would occur. Moscow’s surprising arrival and exit in Syria are only contributing to that change.

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