Mumbai: Islamist Victory, U.S. Setback

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Mumbai: Islamist Victory, U.S. Setback

The Mumbai attack is putting pressure on Pakistan. The Islamists look to come out on top, which is bad news for America.

The November 26 attack on Mumbai, which took several days to put down, was the worst terrorist attack in India’s history. In New Delhi’s eyes, it demands a response. That response, however, may play into the Islamists’ hands and make the U.S.’s fight against terrorism even more complicated.

In the well-planned series of attacks, the city of Mumbai was terrorized as the perpetrators used automatic weapons and hand grenades to attack seemingly random targets and seize two hotels and a Jewish center, killing nearly 180 people.

New Delhi is under no less pressure to respond to an attack of such massive scale than Washington was to 9/11. Not only does the Indian government risk falling if it doesn’t provide what the public sees as an adequate response to protect the country (the main opposition party is trying to bring down the ruling coalition over its handling of the crisis), but the very real threat of further Islamist terrorist attacks on India remains. Indeed, it is not known whether planning for further attacks is even now in the works.

As a consequence, with the fingers of blame pointing across India’s western border, the pressure on Pakistan is great. Islamabad will have to either adequately demonstrate a forceful crackdown on Islamists within Pakistan or else risk India doing so instead.

According to the strategic intelligence service Stratfor, it looks like Pakistan may be more afraid of India than it is of the Islamists. But even if the Pakistani government does attempt to rein in Islamist terrorist groups in the country, whether its efforts will be sufficient to satisfy India is another matter. And besides, with the tentacles of Islamism running through the whole of Pakistani society, including the military and intelligence services, it is unclear whether the weak Pakistani government would even have the ability to make a difference. If it does, it risks tearing the whole country apart. Support for the Islamists runs deep, and any effective action against them would provoke massive public resistance and likely result in the collapse of the Pakistani government.

This is one of the reasons why, despite pressure from Washington, Pakistan had not already made a real effort to rein in the Islamist terrorist movement in the country. India, however, probably considers it has no option but to force Pakistan to bring the Islamists under control—and this could well mean military action. Stratfor says such a military response could come in the form of either a confrontation on the ground, airborne strikes and/or a naval blockade. A response involving ground troops would likely target Islamist militants in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir—a red line for the Pakistanis, which would likely mean a response from Islamabad and an escalation of hostilities.

Given the historically hostile nature of India and Pakistan’s relationship, an Indian incursion into Pakistani territory certainly could not be tolerated by Islamabad as U.S. incursions in the northwest of the country have been. Indian pressure on Pakistan could easily escalate into war—with a nuclear twist. It was only seven years ago that tensions between India and Pakistan following a terrorist attack escalated to the point that nuclear threats were exchanged between the two nuclear powers. The “potential for very real and very fast escalation” is possible, says Stratfor (December 4).

In turn, a crisis on the India-Pakistan border would at the very least complicate matters for the U.S. in its war in Afghanistan. Islamabad has already threatened to shift 100,000 of its troops, currently stationed on its border with Afghanistan, to its border with India should New Delhi start amassing troops there.

Stratfor reports (December 3):

[W]ith a weak and fractured government, a military and intelligence establishment that has lost control, a spreading jihadist insurgency and an economy on the brink of bankruptcy, Pakistan is not in good shape. A military confrontation on its eastern border easily could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back in Islamabad, thereby frustrating U.S. military operations in the region and creating an even more fertile environment for jihadist activities in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and the wider world.

For these reasons, Washington is urging restraint on India’s part. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in New Delhi December 3 to urge India not to take aggressive action against Pakistan. It is hard for the U.S. to be too forceful in urging India to exercise restraint, however, when India is only looking to respond to its own 9/11 in precisely the same way Washington did back in 2001—by going after the state that gave safe harbor to the perpetrators.

In any case, it is unlikely New Delhi will listen to Washington’s urgings. The day following Rice’s visit, the Indian media started reporting that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency was behind the Mumbai attacks—reports likely deliberately leaked by India’s military and intelligence services to help build the case for military action against Pakistan.

Whatever happens, it appears to be a win-win situation for the Islamist terrorists. They have already achieved what it appears they set out to do: create a crisis for Pakistan. Stratfor reports (December 1, emphasis ours throughout):

The Mumbai attackers … clearly were not stupid. They were less interested in killing people in Mumbai than in creating precisely this crisis. First, the Pakistanis are trapped between the United States and India. Second, the government can either turn on the Islamists—unleashing chaos—or refuse to do so, creating an international crisis. In the event of chaos, whoever organized the attack is in a position to increase their influence in Pakistan. In the event the government refuses to act, it will grow more dependent on radical Islamists. In either case, the attack has set into motion a process that could increase the influence of Islamists in Pakistan.

This, in turn, means the U.S.’s fight against terrorism might be about to become that much more difficult. Stratfor writes (December 2):

Should tensions between Pakistan and India escalate militarily, at a minimum the hunt for al Qaeda would need to be suspended as Pakistan shifts forces to defend against India; at a maximum, the American forces in Afghanistan (whose supply lines run through Pakistan) could have front-row seats for a nuclear exchange. It is difficult to envision a scenario in which the United States gets what it wants.

This is just one more demonstration of how the U.S., which could once largely either prevent or determine the outcome of world crises, can now mostly only react to those crises. And increasingly, it has no good options. Whether it be in Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Pakistan—or in the world economy or any other number of arenas—America is finding it has less and less room to maneuver.

America’s power on the world scene has long been compromised—and the evidence of this is increasing. Analysts now regularly detail the loss of U.S. influence in the world—whether economic or geopolitical.

Such trends are a fulfillment of end-time prophecies for America and its sister nations, as outlined by Herbert W. Armstrong in The United States and Britain in Prophecy (request your free copy).

Read “The End of the World as You Know It” for more on what the decline of American influence in the world means.