France: Sidelined from EU Leadership
Ever since the Napoleonic wars ended in 1815, France has occupied a unique and, for it, frustrating point on the spectrum of geopolitical influence. Though the nation is large and strong enough to project its power, it hasn’t possessed quite enough political, economic and military might to secure its national interests on its own. This reality has often driven French leaders to seek alliances with other nations to achieve many of its foreign-policy goals. The most recent of these is the European Union.
From its first discussions in 1948, leading to the official beginning of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, through to the end of the Cold War, the European Union has been a vehicle for French ambition. France’s strategy for exploiting the EU became especially distinct when Charles de Gaulle assumed the presidency of the French Republic in 1959.
De Gaulle’s goal for Europe, wrote Peter Zeihan of Stratfor, was to “take advantage of Germany’s post-war guilt to sublimate German national ambitions completely within France’s European project. Use German markets to fuel French industrial expansion. Use German finances to feed French agriculture. And integrate the two states with the other community members to serve French interests. Despite a number of changes in membership and circumstance, French diplomacy consistently succeeded in convincing the Germans that what was good for Europe (and, by extension, good for France) was good for Germany. France provided the direction and Germany provided the industrial and financial backing; as a result, Europe deepened and broadened” (March 27).
For nearly 40 years—from 1952 until near the end of the Cold War—the EU was the vehicle by which France projected power, dominated Europe and mobilized its national interests.
In 1990, France was struck a blow from which it is still reeling today.
The crash of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany in 1990 was a turning point for France and the EU. Time would prove that German reunification permanently altered the political landscape of Europe—and the world.
Though the French voice remained loud within the EU after German reunification, it became obvious that the newly reunited Germany was beginning to “inject its own preferences—very quietly—into European processes. By the time German reunification was completed in 1999, the press began to refer regularly to the Franco-German partnership rather than the Franco-German motor. It was a subtle but critical difference” (ibid.).
No longer divided or under the thumb of Cold War powers, Germany was beginning to reassert itself—and France was feeling the effects. By the turn of the century, Germany had snatched domination of the EU from France and begun tricking it out as a vehicle for German ambition. Zeihan continued:
During this time, Franco-German relations remained cordial, but the European project began to take a new (German) direction: Germany flexed its newly reunified muscles in the early 1990s and began meddling in what ultimately blossomed into the Yugoslav wars—which a more circumspect France did not appreciate.
German diplomats took the lead in crafting the euro—a currency governed by the same conservative policies used in German, not French, monetary management. Germany stood to benefit the most, both economically and politically, from expanding the European Union eastward. France was justifiably nervous about such efforts, which limited its financial benefits from the Union. It also diluted France’s political control of the organization—the original rationale for creating the Union (in the French mind) in the first place. Germany, not France, is the largest trading partner and political influence on all the states that have joined the Union since 1990. Germany, not France, is the global economic powerhouse. And Germany, not France, is able to hold—indeed, demand—a robust discussion with any major power of the world on any topic. And all this became the state of affairs before the relatively pro-American Angela Merkel became German chancellor.
There can be no doubt that Germany now dominates the European Union. Once the pillar of the EU, France has been systematically and subtly pushed aside in EU leadership. In a remarkable turn of events, the EU has been transformed from a vehicle for French ambition to a vehicle for German ambition.
Witness, for example, Germany’s towering role as the dominant leader on the Continent in the activities of March 25, the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.
Germany’s preponderance within Europe will only grow. We can expect Germany to continue to increase its power and influence over fellow European nations, as well as for France to continue to be marginalized from EU leadership. Biblical prophecy tells us that France and the other nations of Europe are more followers than leaders in this European combine—known in the Bible as the “king of the north“ (Daniel 11:40). The Trumpet monitors Europe from the perspective of biblical prophecy, and as we have regularly pointed out over the years, the nation most behind the unification and leadership of the king of the north is Germany. The Bible tells us this is the nation to watch.
With this in mind, there is a trend that involves France we can expect to see: France will be further sidelined from leadership of the EU. While it is true that France and Germany have been the two primary nations behind the unification of Europe, France’s influence in the EU will continue to wane, and it will become more of a follower of Germany than a leader with Germany. Bible prophecy reveals this fact.
France’s diminishing role in the EU is only significant as it relates to the fulfillment of Bible prophecy. And while prophecy does not specifically discuss France’s waning influence, it does discuss Germany’s increasing influence. The time of France riding Germany’s coattails in the leadership of Europe is about to end. France’s diminishing leadership will allow Germany’s influence over Europe to grow. This is a trend you can expect to intensify.