Nato is failing in Afghanistan. The nation is experiencing the worst wave of violence since nato troops ousted the Taliban in 2001. Reconstruction progress has stalled. The Taliban is gaining strength and the opium drug trade is reaping more profits today than it did before the United States invaded. Not exactly what nato intended when it sent 31,000 troops to Afghanistan.

Up against such challenges, nato is demanding that its German contingent step up and begin shouldering more responsibility.

nato members were to aid in specific aspects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction: The U.S. was to train a new 70,000-man army; Japan was to demobilize Afghanistan’s private militia; Italy was to develop a new judicial system; Britain was to lead efforts at crippling Afghanistan’s drug cultivation; and Germany was to train a new 62,000-member police force. How have they fared with their assignments?

“Very disappointing,” was how nato Supreme Allied Commander James L. Jones described the results of the German police training (Spiegel Online, November 20). nato officials described the police force as “poorly trained, poorly paid and corrupt.” Japan made no gains in disarming the bands of militia. In its task, Italy has done so poorly that war criminals simply do not fear being prosecuted as criminals or drug dealers. British efforts have resulted in Afghanistan reaping record harvests of opium. In fact, 92 percent of heroin sold in the world can be traced back to Afghan fields.

Worse, neither nato nor the Afghan government has managed to keep the Taliban at bay. The Taliban has resurged, primarily in the southern part of the nation.

Various combat engagements reported in southern Afghanistan showed “signs of another military buildup,” stated a recent situation report prepared for German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung (ibid.).

Another report suggested that Islamic terrorists were “taking advantage of a current power vacuum … and the proximity to the southern fields of operation to become established structurally in the region” (ibid.).

The southern part of Afghanistan is patrolled by U.S., Canadian, Dutch and British forces, while the northern, more peaceful region is watched by German troops. German deployment to the north means Germany loses fewer soldiers in combat than other nations.

So far, the Afghanistan operation has caused the deaths of 42 Canadians, 41 Britons and 350 Americans, but only 18 Germans.

This gap between German casualties and those of other nations is prompting member nations to call for Germany to beef up its contribution, which so far has been limited to non-combat roles. The Germans are perceived as being “social workers in military fatigues.” That is something nato wants to change

“We’re sending two coffins home every week, while you Germans hand out crayons and wool blankets,” complained a British officer to a German officer in nato headquarters.

So—nato wants more German military involvement. One U.S. official recently expressed it this way: “The Germans have to learn how to kill” (ibid.).

It’s an ironic statement. It is true that modern Germany has been skittish about exercising military power for fear of resurrecting the ghosts of World Wars i and ii. And it is because of that very history, the capstones of an even more voluminous history of German militarism, that “The Germans have to learn how to kill” makes the ears tingle. Meanwhile, the Germans are showing themselves increasingly eager to break free of the shackles those negative associations have placed upon them.

As in Lebanon, it is the international community that is pressuring Germany to increase its military contribution and assume more responsibility in Afghanistan. But, as reluctant as the Germans have been to accept combat roles, their defense ministry has long planned for such an eventuality, analyzing battle plans that would deploy 1,000 German troops from the north to the south to aid Germany’s allies. They are ready for it; the planning shows that they even want it.

“The upshot,” writes Spiegel, “is that Berlin may be entering the final phase of its return to the international stage, one in which German soldiers could soon embark on combat missions where they will shoot and be shot at. The question now is whether Germany is ready—emotionally, politically and militarily—for war” (ibid.).

As the cloak of pacifism that Germany has shrouded itself in since the last world war increasingly gives way, the world will see that this emerging global power is indeed ready for war.