War may begin in Gaza before the end of 2006, according to an October 25Wall Street Journal editorial. Author Bret Stephens reveals a number of players: Hamas, Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian government and, of course, Israel. He speculates that the winner will be whoever manages to stay out of the fighting.

In truth, however, the entity that will most profit from a war in Gaza is already clear.

The politics in Gaza appears confusing. Stephens points to “three sets of circumstances” developing there:

First is the civil unrest between Hamas and Fatah. While Hamas, led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, continues to embrace violence and refuses to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, it fights against its moderate, yet still anti-Israel, opponents in the Palestinian Authority, including President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas has recently assassinated the top Fatah militiaman and killed an intelligence officer. Nevertheless, this week President Abbas is attempting to negotiate a deal with Hamas—the latest in a series of attempts to resolve their differences. If this deal goes through, Haniyeh would reportedly step down and be replaced by an “independent” selected by Hamas; and a unity government would be formed with a Hamas majority. The new platform, rather than renouncing violence and acknowledging Israel’s right to exist, would simply be silent on the subject. In other words, the terrorists would get most of what they want.

While this situation is unstable, it is unlikely to actually spark the war in Gaza. We can be certain that, ultimately, the main fight will not occur among the Palestinians, but between the Palestinians and Israel.

The second circumstance prevailing in the Gaza Strip is the consolidation of this slice of land into a terrorist fortress.

Last year, Israel withdrew from Gaza under the belief that a smaller Israel would be a more defensible Israel. Events have proven the fallacy in that idea: the number of attacks immediately increased, and are now being launched from closer to the heart of Israel.

Gaza is filled with weaponry, much of which has been smuggled from Egypt; since June, the Israeli Army has discovered 25 tunnels burrowed under the border, through which, in the last year, “at least 19 tons of explosives have been smuggled … plus some 15,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 1,000 rpgs, and quantities of Katyusha rockets, Strella antiaircraft missiles and Russian-made Kornet and Metis antitank missiles” (ibid.).

Meanwhile, Hamas seems to be itching for a fight. On October 16, the terrorist group’s Izzadin al-Kassam brigades released a statement that it has the “means and arms necessary to confront the Zionist enemy with all our force” and that, “We have finished preparations to teach the Zionist enemy a lesson it will not forget.”

To counter this growing threat, the Israeli government launched an offensive last week to try to reduce rocket attacks. Before the strike, however, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said Israel had no intention of reoccupying Gaza.

The third circumstance—perhaps least known to the public—is the threat Hamas poses to Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt. Stephens believes this is even greater than its threat to Israel. Hamas’s success among the Palestinians could easily create a sympathetic surge in support among Egyptians for the Muslim Brotherhood. That party’s growing popularity is a direct threat to President Mubarak’s rule. He has already cancelled elections that the Brotherhood seemed in a position to win and changed electoral law to minimize its participation in the political process. Also in an effort to limit Hamas’s influence, Mubarak has permitted smuggling to Fatah.

Having noted these “three sets of circumstances” and the myriad players involved, Stephens concludes that whoever stays out of the fighting wins—yet offers no suggestion as to who might accomplish that.

This analysis is one player short. Analysis of Middle East politics can appear complicated, but there is an underlying simplicity: All of the terrorist groups involved are taking their cues from Iran. Iran funds Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Authority. Iran has a longstanding goal to take control of Jerusalem and, as its president succinctly stated, to wipe Israel “off the map.”

Make no mistake: The war in Lebanon was precisely timed to benefit that cause, and not by the leaders of Hezbollah; rather, Iran is calling the shots. Having seen how war in Lebanon helped achieve Iran’s goals, we know the terrorists in Gaza will get their signal to ignite war when Iran decides it will bring it closest to the goal of controlling Jerusalem.

No matter who wins, Israel loses, as it has at every step in this peaceless process. Intended to bring peace to the Middle East, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was a colossal failure. Gaza rapidly became the preferred staging ground for rocket attacks, made possible by a gift from the Israelis to the terrorists. Now Israel is facing actual war in Gaza. Given the instability in the region, it is not a question of if, but when. The war in Gaza will strike exactly when the head of the snake—Iran—decides it is time.