What North Korea’s Nuclear Test Exposed About Our World

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What North Korea’s Nuclear Test Exposed About Our World

The second of two articles exploring the ramifications of Kim Jong Il’s introduction into the nuclear club

North Korea’s detonation of a nuclear bomb last week revealed much about the present state of global geopolitics. Yesterday we discussed three unsavory truths unveiled by this important development. Here we look at two more.

One: The United States is so militarily and tactically stretched that it cannot handle new threats.

The United States is in a state of crisis overload. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are absorbing far more money, manpower and resources than the U.S. ever expected to expend on them. A volatile Iran and several other smaller emergencies also command attention: Israel, the make-up of the UN Security Council, Venezuela, Cuba, immigration and so on. Don’t even mention the looming congressional elections.

Certainly one must acknowledge that Kim Jong Il figured U.S. overstretch into his calculus in choosing his moment to detonate a nuclear weapon. As Dr. George Friedman described it, his nation decided this was “the perfect time to jerk Washington’s chain” (October 10).

The success of Kim’s gamble is reflected in the weakness of Washington’s response, which to this point has amounted to little more than fussy condemnations. President Bush has explicitly stated, “We have no intention of attacking North Korea.”

As Fraser Nelson wrote in The Business on October 13, “Three years ago, President Bush said that he ‘would not tolerate’ a nuclear North Korea—exactly the same form of words he uses for Iran now. But on Monday, the president moved the goalposts. He said it would be a ‘grave threat’ if North Korea were to sell its nukes to anyone else. A nuclear North Korea, it seems, will be tolerated after all.

“This is the lesson for Iran: Dictators with the bomb are treated differently to those without it.”

Friedman explained the problem facing Washington: “[T]he military reality on the ground in Iraq severely constrains U.S. options around the world. That, in turn, constrains U.S. diplomacy. Diplomacy without even the distant possibility of military action is impotent” (op. cit.). It is possible that Kim, in his megalomania, believes the U.S. is poised and ready to attack his nation on a moment’s notice. Realistically, however, it isn’t feasible. Already, in order to bolster its presence in the Middle East, the U.S. has reduced its force on the Korean Peninsula. Supposed superpower status notwithstanding, its options regarding North Korea are extraordinarily limited.

Critics excoriate the Bush administration for its “unilateral” handling of the Iraq threat, which is perceived to have created the unwinnable situation that nation is in today. To whatever degree this view may be correct, North Korea illustrates the difficulties posed by the opposite approach—rigid multilateralism.

Dr. Friedman continued, “North Korea is a perfect example of what multilateral diplomacy without a unilateral military option looks like: The United States has recruited Russia, China, Japan and South Korea for diplomatic initiatives with North Korea as it partnered with Russia and European powers for dealings with Iran. Since the interests of these powers diverge, the possibility of concerted action, even on sanctions, simply does not exist. Since the possibility of unilateral action by the United States also does not exist, neither North Korea nor Iran need take the diplomatic initiatives seriously. And they don’t” (ibid.).

Unable to respond to any new threats militarily, America can only talk tough. But its bluff is being called. North Korea’s nuclear test has clearly exposed just how overstretched the U.S. has become. This fact is far from being lost on other nations, including Iran, Russia, China and Germany.

This reality has enormous implications. It appears the days of America being able to maintain the status quo in international relations are past—and no signs exist that it can ever recover this ability. The door is thus open for other nations, or coalitions of nations, to begin to assert their wills and act aggressively in their own interests.

This portends dramatic changes in the world order, economically, politically, militarily.

Whatever direction this geopolitical restructuring takes, clearly it will be radically different from what we see today.

Two: Asia is likely to accelerate its arms race.

Russia, China and Japan are three powers on the rise, increasingly pushing their presence internationally. Kim Jong Il’s nuclear test provides a pretext for accelerating their military endeavors.

After the nuclear test, Japan said it did not want a nuclear weapon, having personally witnessed its horrors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War ii. Government officials referred to their dependence upon American promises to retaliate against any foe that would attack their nation.

But with the United States preoccupied elsewhere, the Japanese must consider this deterrent shaky at best. The debate over whether Japan should have nuclear weapons capability is back. In the wake of North Korea’s test, Shoichi Nakagawa, head of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Policy Research Council, advised reigniting the national discussion over the question. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso yesterday reinforced the notion, calling for a national debate. This only adds to talk in recent months on the same subject, a sign of what many Japanese view as the tenuous nature of their alliance with Washington.

Japan’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, says he sees his country under direct threat from North Korea and has spoken of the need to speed up plans for a missile defense shield.

China and Russia, both nuclear powers themselves, do not see a serious threat in even a nuclear-armed North Korea, which is why their efforts to contain the threat have been all talk, little action. But both powers appear bent on maximizing the discomfort the U.S. experiences over the situation, further squeezing out its presence in their part of the world.

If anything, North Korea’s new nuclear status only highlights the profound differences between America’s national interests and those of Russia and China.

All of the realities uncovered by North Korea’s power move—the failure of nonproliferation efforts, the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, the opportunities open to Iran, the limits of America’s geopolitical options, and the rise of a more heavily armed Asia—illustrate the urgency of the time in which we live. Checks on more such power grabs, and on war-making on a devastating scale, are proving ineffective. The muscularity and confidence of new, more unpredictable powers is growing stronger.

Jesus Christ once warned of certain signs of the end of this age, and cautioned: “[W]hen ye shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the doors.” To the student of those prophecies, events of the past couple of weeks represent a hastening toward the climactic conclusion of the present age.

If you want to learn more about those prophecies, theTrumpet.com recommends reading these free booklets: The King of the South, and Russia and China in Prophecy.