What North Korea’s Nuclear Test Exposed About Our World

Reuters

What North Korea’s Nuclear Test Exposed About Our World

The first of two articles exploring the ramifications of Kim Jong Il’s introduction into the nuclear club

Over a week has passed since North Korea detonated a nuclear bomb, thrusting itself into the nuclear club. It is the ninth member of the club, but the first that is so unpredictable and openly hostile to the United States.

This development reveals five unsavory truths about our world, three of which we will discuss today.

One: Nonproliferation efforts are effectively dead.

Though Cold War public fear of nuclear war is gone, the threat is greater now than ever. Despite all efforts to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear material and know-how is making its way into more and more hands, some of which could well be extraordinarily dangerous.

North Korea represents the greatest danger to date. Other states threaten to follow soon.

North Korea’s announcement comes at a time when several other nations are pushing for nuclear programs, including South Africa, Egypt, Venezuela, and, of course, Iran. Evidence suggests strong links between those involved in North Korea’s program and those in Iran and Venezuela.

During the Cold War, the United States limited the power of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal by simply out-arming it. The potential of mutually assured destruction prevented both powers from launching the first weapon. With some of these newer nuclear powers, however, it is not nearly so clear that state survival is so important.

The nonproliferation solution—simply to keep wmd out of their hands—was bound to only last so long. As Charles Krauthammer once wrote, “[W]eapons of mass destruction are not new. What is new is that the knowledge required to make them is no longer esoteric. Anyone with a reasonable education in modern physics, chemistry or biology can brew them. Doomsday has been democratized.”

Though global diplomatic activity continues at a frenzied pace, global military expenditures continue to rise, approaching a trillion dollars annually. This amounts to a full-scale, breakout arms race on a scale never seen in history.

Sadly, it is a mere matter of time before one of these powers—and it is not unreasonable to view Kim Jong Il’s North Korea as a candidate—decides to begin using these weapons on its enemies.

Nonproliferation efforts—noble as they are—have all but fulfilled their lifespan. The new age of proliferation we have entered can only have one conclusion: world war on a mass scale.

Two: The United Nations is as impotent as ever.

Few international objectives have enjoyed as much unanimity among nations as the desire to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of North Korea. That being the case, one would think that the UN would be the ideal instrument for ensuring that this objective was met, decisively.

Not so.

For years, as North Korea trumpeted its intentions to build a nuclear arsenal, the world witnessed the spectacle of the UN—supposedly intent on preventing this from happening—undergoing an elaborate diplomatic dance that, in essence, did nothing to hinder North Korea from its goals.

Now that Kim’s country has successfully achieved its ambition, we can expect the spectacle to move, for a short time, into a fancier phase, while achieving precisely the same result: that is, nothing.

The United Nations Security Council agreed last weekend to apply sanctions against North Korea for detonating the nuclear weapon. North Korea responded by labeling the sanctions a declaration of war. It said it would not be cowed by such pressure since it was now a nuclear power.

History has already proven that economic measures do nothing to curb North Korea’s behavior.

On top of that, China and Russia have already made clear they will not comply with the sanctions, rendering useless whatever small effect they might have had.

Stratfor argues convincingly that both nations are comfortable with North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, only because the benefits outweigh the problems. China likes the fact that “the test flouts America’s will and the United States is unable to do anything about it,” in Stratfor’s words (October 13). “American impotence is of direct interest to China. The United States has maneuvered itself into a position of taking primary responsibility for dealing with North Korea’s threat. China, seeking a dominant position in Asia, welcomes anything that makes the United States appear incapable of carrying out this role. The weaker the United States appears, the greater the vacuum for China to step into. Beijing is going to make the appropriate sounds, but will also make certain that the United States looks as helpless as possible.” Russia has a similar goal in mind, mostly because of its competition with the U.S. over territory in Central Asia.

Thus, these two permanent members of the UN Security Council, while making public statements that appear to be in line with America’s position, are basing their decisions on criteria directly at odds with those of the U.S.

Not a good basis for a strong multilateral response against North Korea’s provocative act.

Thus, for having detonated a nuclear weapon, thumbing his nose at the entire world, Kim Jong Il will face, in effect, no consequences from the UN. His success places on a stage, in a spotlight, the irrefutable truth that this organization is truly unable to accomplish anything.

Three: Iran’s conviction that it has nothing to fear by seeking nuclear weapons is justified.

The Islamic Republic—which is only half a step behind North Korea in announcing its own entrance into the nuclear club—is watching this unfolding drama with a Cheshire grin on its face.

American politicians are speaking incessantly of the fact that anything less than a firm response to North Korea will embolden Iran. And yet—in both the international sphere, through instruments like the UN or the vaunted “six-party talks” that were intended to keep nuclear weapons out of North Korea’s hands in the first place, and individually as a nation—the reality that the United States simply cannot manage anything close to a firm response is becoming abundantly clear.

The fact is, even a firm response to North Korea would be unlikely to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program. Its president has plainly said that nothing would prevent his nation from achieving that ambition, and possesses a mythic belief that any catastrophes that his aggressiveness provokes will only hasten the advent of the Islamic messiah and the global ascendancy of his faith.

With Iran’s leader already devoid of scruples, perhaps it is a moot point to suggest that North Korea, whose nuclear scientists are in cahoots with those of Iran, successfully detonating its first nuclear weapon and facing no penalties, would hasten the day that Iran would do the same.

But perhaps it isn’t.