Missing Nukes


Last December, just days after Libya announced plans to cease its nuclear weapons program, Libyan intelligence officials revealed that a shipment of nuclear equipment was missing. Nearly six months later, investigators “are still struggling to account for a number of sensitive parts Libya ordered for construction of its uranium enrichment plant—parts that potentially could be used by other countries or groups seeking nuclear weapons” (Washington Post, May 29).

Libya had purchased enough equipment to give it the ability to produce sufficient enriched uranium for several nuclear bombs a year. Now, it appears that “Libya received only a fraction of the parts needed …. Some of the most sensitive parts never arrived …” (ibid.).

These missing nuclear weapons components are just some of the unknowns being searched for in the biggest nuclear smuggling investigation in history—the probe into the nuclear black market operated by Pakistan’s Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Washington is worried about the danger that unaccounted-for nuclear material in the hands of terrorists would pose to America.

In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel P. Huntington wrote, “Terrorism historically is the weapon of the weak …. At some point, however, a few terrorists will be able to produce massive violence and massive destruction. Separately, terrorism and nuclear weapons are the weapons of the non-Western weak. If and when they are combined, the non-Western weak will be strong.”

To learn more about these dangers, read our March/April 2003 article “Arming for Armageddon” under Issue Archives on www.theTrumpet.com.